“FEB 3, 1961: The Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] approve JCSM 57-61, the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan for Cuba and forward it to Defense Secretary [Robert] McNamara. The evaluation concludes that \u2018since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks\u2019 but \u2018lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead.\u2019 According to the JCS, \u2018the operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.\u2019 At the same time, the evaluation cautions that: \u2018It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third hand reports. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a \u2018fair\u2019 chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n